Neuroeconomic Approaches to Mental Disorders  by Kishida, Kenneth T. et al.
Neuron
PerspectiveNeuroeconomic Approaches to Mental DisordersKenneth T. Kishida,1 Brooks King-Casas,1,2 and P. Read Montague1,2,*
1Department of Neuroscience and Computational Psychiatry Unit
2Menninger Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX 77030, USA
*Correspondence: read@bcm.edu
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.07.021
The pervasiveness of decision-making in every area of human endeavor highlights the importance of under-
standing choice mechanisms and their detailed relationship to underlying neurobiological function. This
review surveys the recent and productive application of game-theoretic probes (economic games) to mental
disorders. Such games typically possess concrete concepts of optimal play, thus providing quantitative
ways to track when subjects’ choices match or deviate from optimal. This feature equips economic games
with natural classes of control signals that should guide learning and choice in the agents that play them.
These signals and their underlying physical correlates in the brain are now being used to generate objective
biomarkers that may prove useful for exposing and understanding the neurogenetic basis of normal and
pathological human cognition. Thus, game-theoretic probes represent some of the first steps toward
producing computationally principled, objective measures of cognitive function and dysfunction useful for
the diagnosis, treatment, and understanding of mental disorders.The Biological Value of Gambling
The idea of a game typically rouses feelings of amusement and
play. Over the last several hundred years, games have taken
on a more cerebral bearing and are now an accepted approach
to understanding important features of strategic interactions in
the broadest sense. Games and the game theories that prescribe
their optimal solutions have infiltrated many areas of application.
The list is long and growing, including war games between
groups of humans (Kahn, 1960), predator-prey games (May-
nard-Smith, 1982), strategic interactions between mobile organ-
isms and their natural environments, economic exchanges
between individuals and institutions (Niederle and Roth, 2003;
Roth, 2008), and so on. In the economics literature, a game is
often depicted as a decision problem with structure so that
one’s payoffs can depend on one’s own choices and some other
input. For an organism, the biggest gambling game is investing
its limited energetic resources into pursuing some prey or food
source in the presence of uncertainty about the likely yields
from such efforts. Consequently, there is biological survival
value, and thus selective pressure, in being a good gambler in
the real world, where toomany bad gambles result in the ultimate
loss—death.
Ironically, gambling games represent one of themost insidious
applications of games to real-world biology. We say insidious
because gambling and related addictions represent a huge
medical, social, and fiscal problem. Despite these problematic
outcomes, gambling games are now being used to probe the
neural and cognitive substrates of decision-making. This usage
makes sense. Games of chance are literally as old as recorded
history and provide excellent probes of many important features
of motivated choice. They require that an agent frame a situation
(understand the goals and outcomes of a game), estimate and
value possible outcomes and trajectories leading to outcomes,
and make choices conditioned on these valuations. It is no
secret that gambling games work. Games of chance found incasinos routinely extract enormous amounts of valuable
resources (typically cash) from otherwise healthy human beings.
Why is this? The simple answer is that the structure of gambling
games is not arbitrary—they coevolved over thousands of years
around human nervous systems. Therefore, gambling games
have design features that exploit exactly the frailties in human
decision-making systems while also maintaining the human
desire to play them. These games are now being used as sensi-
tive probes of human valuation machinery. In humans and
nonhuman primates, such probes are now producing new
insights when paired with measures of neural function (Camerer,
2003; Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Lee, 2005; Camerer and
Fehr, 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Rangel
et al., 2008; Montague and Assad, 2008; DeMartino et al., 2010).
Gambling Games and the Neural Processing
of Uncertainty
As described above, gambling games have a particularly potent
impact on human behavior. They have evolved in the context of
humans to exploit limitations in our capacity to estimate proba-
bilities. These limitations take many forms, including our well-
known penchant for overrepresenting rare events, our rapid
overgeneralization on the basis of scant data, and numerous
value-illusions to which humans are subject (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974, 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). For
this discussion, we focus on probabilistic games where
behavioral options come equipped with payoff probabilities
and returns, and players may know these well or not at all. The
strength of using the games is that one can calculate ahead of
time the likelihoods of payoffs and the risks involved, and, as
the game progresses, one can update these computations in
a principled way. Any problems in estimating the value of an
option, the risk, and the likely payoffs will be mirrored by esti-
mable changes in returns—usually losses. And one would
expect such problems in the presence of brain damage,Neuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 543
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of using gambling game probes in human populations.
One excellent example of using a gambling game to probe
risk-dependent choice and its connection to neural systems
was carried out by Hsu et al. (2005). One goal of this experiment
was to uncover neural differences in the brain’s response to two
kinds of uncertainty—risk and ambiguity. In economic circles,
these terms are distinguished by the confidence in the probabil-
ities assigned to outcomes. Risk is the probability (judged by any
means) of possible outcomes and their associated payoffs—in
practice, this often means that such probabilities are known
exactly for the outcomes, that is, no error bars on the probabili-
ties. Ambiguity is also such a probability assignment, but in the
presence of little, bad, or no evidence for having confidence in
the assignment. There is some sloppiness here regarding the
use of these terms, but ambiguity implies something like the
‘‘biggest error bars possible’’ or ‘‘terribly large error bars’’ on
the probabilities while the source of this varying lack of confi-
dence doesn’t matter. In real-world experiments, humans don’t
like ambiguity, and their nervous systems will indeed take
account of the confidence in an estimate. Hsu et al. examined
limiting cases for how a human nervous systemdeals with uncer-
tainty and then applied the same experiment to subjects with
lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex. The main finding that emerged
was that a frank lesion in orbitofrontal cortex correlated with
a lack of sensitivity to risk and ambiguity. This was not true of
a matched ‘‘control lesion group’’ who possessed lesions else-
where in the brain, yet still displayed sensitivity to both risk and
ambiguity as probed by their task. Huettel and colleagues
used an even more extreme notion of ambiguity where the prob-
abilities are unknown and showed that this particular case may
involve dedicated neural systems (Huettel et al., 2006; also see
Tom et al., 2007). In a remarkable two-subject experiment,
DeMartino et al. (2010) used monetary gambles to show that
subjects with focal bilateral amygdala damage had a dramatic
reduction in loss aversion compared to matched controls,
a result consistent with the amygdala’s role in response inhibition
to fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., see Delgado et al., 2008).
These findings collectively suggest that loss of identified brain
tissue correlates with a complete loss or at least dramatic dimi-
nution in sensitivity to uncertainty. Why review such evidence in
a piece relating neuroeconomic probes to mental disorders?
Let’s answer this by considering the problem the other way
around. Imagine that we profiled a large population of subjects
on risk and ambiguity sensitivity experiments, found a subpopu-
lation with diminished sensitivities along these dimensions, and
chased this maneuver with brain imaging (structural and func-
tion) experiments. The economic probe becomes a way to
uncover possible problems in orbitofrontal cortex exposed by
the demands of a risk-dependent task like that illustrated by
Hsu et al. (2005). We have the example from the lesion patients
that loss of orbitofrontal tissues diminishes sensitivity to risk
(e.g., Clark et al., 2008), but subtler changes in this region could
express the same behavioral changes seen with injuries or
changes in gene expression in the area. Screening on sensitivity
to risk and ambiguity also has important practical uses for mental
disorders where impulsivity, valuation, and decision-making can
all be concurrently perturbed. This is also an important area to544 Neuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.pursue because of the prevalence of frontal head injuries in
sporting events, war zones, and recreational activity that, while
not resulting in structurally detectable damage, could well be
detectable by differences in functional imaging signatures in
this or other regions.
Biomarkers Exposed by Gambling Games
The relatively blunt demonstration of how altered function in
select brain regions (i.e., loss of function due to a lesion) alters
computations of valuation and decision-making behavior
preludes the role gambling games will have in determining
biomarkers of abnormal decision-making as expressed in
a range of mental disorders. Recent efforts to characterize
biomarkers of mental disorders using gambling games include
examples in drug addiction and schizophrenia.
Recently, Chiu et al. assessed sated and unsated nicotine
addicts compared to nonsmoker controls using a sequential
investment task and fMRI (Chiu et al., 2008b; Lohrenz et al.,
2007). The sequential investment task (Lohrenz et al., 2007)
was designed around current models of dopaminergic function
and the notion that model-based parameters could be used to
extract physiological correlates—biomarkers—of rational
control signals. This model-based approach yielded insight
into quantifiable parameters that predict behavior, the neural
basis of control signals underlying choice behavior, and how
brains addicted to nicotine express altered behavioral respon-
sivity to these control signals. Chiu and colleagues demonstrate
that control subjects’ subsequent choice in the sequential game
is best predicted by a normative control signal, the fictive error,
and show that the caudate nucleus generates a signal consistent
with computation of this fictive error. The fictive error as
expressed in this game is a counterfactual signal about ‘‘what
could have been,’’ if the subject had made a different decision
(invested more or less) and is parameterized by the change in
market price and the subject’s investment level (see Camerer
and Ho, [1999] for earlier approaches to reinforcement learning
models that incorporate parameters for counterfactual signals
analogous to the fictive error). Smokers demonstrated the fictive
error signal in the same brain region, but their behavior was no
longer predicted by this computation—suggesting that compu-
tation of the fictive error term was intact in the smokers’ brain,
but was disconnected from influencing their behavior. This
computational term is consistent with the gains smokers know-
ingly forego (money savings, increased quality of health, and
length of life) in order to continue their habit.
Efforts to estimate parameters related to impulsive behaviors
often expressed in drug addicts have also utilized simple
gambling games aimed at determining temporal discounting
behavior. Temporal discounting tasks consist of choices like
‘‘choose one of two options,’’ option A: money now (say $2) or
option B: more money ($10) at some later time, t. The cost asso-
ciated with waiting to acquire some dollar amount later (temporal
delay) discounts the value of the later option and is known as
temporal discounting behavior. This kind of gamble is ecologi-
cally relevant to everyday human decisions: ‘‘do I fill up my gas
tank now at some cost, or do I wait and risk not finding gas later
at a better price, or worse yet, running out of gas before finding
another station.’’ Bickel and colleagues demonstrated that
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differentiates choice behavior in humans addicted to nicotine
compared to nonaddicts during a temporal discounting task
(Bickel et al., 2008). Nonsmokers expressed hyperbolic dis-
counting behavior, as did smokers; however, the slope of the
discount function for smokers is significantly steeper. They
discount future gains at a faster rate than nonsmokers. The
slope of the discount function is suggestive of a parameter for
impulsivity that ought to show natural variability in the human
population.
Paulus and colleagues have used neuroimaging and simple
gambling tasks to assess choice behavior in methamphetamine
addicts. In sum, the tasks used were variations of simple
gambling games: (1) two-choice gamble with variable reward
probabilities (Paulus et al., 2003b; Vollenweider et al., 2005; Pau-
lus et al., 2005, 2008), (2) a risky temporal delay task (Leland and
Paulus, 2005), and (3) a card prediction game with parameter-
ized levels of certainty and probability of success of choice
outcomes (Leland et al., 2006; Critchley et al., 2001). These
studies took advantage of a number of simple gambles and
models of subjects’ behavior given the rational constraints of
the tasks to determine measures that distinguished the stimulant
users from the control groups. These experiments demonstrate
that methamphetamine addicts can be distinguished from
controls via altered brain activation and behavioral patterns
that are consistent with poor decision-making in these subjects,
including increased risk taking (Leland and Paulus, 2005),
increased impulsivity (Leland et al., 2006; Paulus et al., 2008),
and altered brain and behavioral responses to errors (Paulus
et al., 2003b; Vollenweider et al., 2005; Paulus et al., 2008).
Notably, in one study the parameters extracted from behavioral
patterns expressed during a simple two-choice gamble with and
without uncertainty and the associated brain responses
measured with fMRI could be used to predict relapse in a cohort
of treatment-seeking methamphetamine addicts (Paulus et al.,
2005).
Drug addicts by definition make poor decisions (continued
drug abuse in the face of adverse consequences), and the fact
that gambling games can identify quantifiable behavioral charac-
teristics and neuroimaging-based biomarkers that distinguish
users from nonusers is promising. Evidence from early work
suggests that these paradigms will also be useful for identifying
biomarkers in other mental disorders, including schizophrenia
(Paulus et al., 2003a), neuroticism outcomes (Feinstein et al.,
2006; Paulus et al., 2003c), high-trait anxiety (Paulus et al.,
2004), panic disorder (Ludewig et al., 2003), bipolar disorder
(Minassian et al., 2004), and autism (Minassian et al., 2007). In
these studies, a number of parameters are determined from
choice behavior on simple gambling games. Associated alter-
ations in brain responses are demonstrated for subjects with
schizophrenia (Paulus et al., 2003a), neuroticism (Feinstein
et al., 2006; Paulus et al., 2003c), and high-trait anxiety (Paulus
et al., 2004). Behavioral characteristics derived from model-
based analyses of sequences of choice behavior also differen-
tiate control participants from those with schizophrenia (Paulus
et al., 1999, 1996), panic disorder (Ludewig et al., 2003), bipolar
disorder (Minassian et al., 2004), and autism (Minassian et al.,
2007). The specificity of these behavioral parameters and theassociated brain responses has yet to be determined, and to
call these signals true biomarkers is still premature. However,
these studies suggest that biomarkers for mental disorders
may be determined using human neuroimaging paired with
game-theoretic probes, which possess critical features (i.e.,
equilibrium solutions and best responses) formore sophisticated
model-based approaches.
Equilibrium Solutions and Best Responses
One of the more important features of game-theoretic probes is
the solution concept for the game, that is, the way that rational
self-interested players should play the game in order to maxi-
mize their own returns. Solution concepts for game-theoretical
probes are valuable because they can be used to guess the
kinds of control or learning signals that an organism would
need to generate in order to play the game optimally (Camerer,
2003; Rangel et al., 2008). Simple games therefore provide an
excellent way to expose the computations underlying value-
dependent choice in humans (Guth et al., 1982; Axelrod, 1984;
Roth, 1995; Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al.,
2009; Montague et al., 2006).
In the domain of solution concepts, the idea of Nash equilib-
rium has been a leading principle (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991;
Nash, 1950). In a strategic interaction between two agents (two
humans, a human and an institution, two institutions, etc.), the
Nash equilibria are the set of choices by the two agents where
no unilateral change by either agent can improve their outcome.
More colloquially, in the absence of some other knowledge, if my
choice is at a Nash equilibrium, then any other choice that I might
have made does not improve my payoff. This statement also
applies to my partner. The concept of Nash equilibrium is illus-
trated in Figure 1. In this case, we show the payoffs for each
player in a table. For illustration purposes, we show the simple
example of a simultaneous game where each player chooses
their actions (there are two available to each player) independent
of their partner, after which the choices and their attendant
payoffs are revealed to both players.
Now consider the case where player 1 takes action 1 and
player 2 takes action 2. This places each player in the upper
right-hand cell of the payoff table. This is not a Nash equilibrium,
since the outcome would improve for either player had they
chosen the alternative action. This same conclusion would be
true if player 1 had chosen action 2 and player 2 had chosen
action 1, thus placing them in the lower left-hand cell of the table.
In this illustration, the Nash equilibria are indicated by green
circles. Let’s suppose that the players make choices that place
them in the upper left-hand cell. This set of choices is a Nash
equilibrium because if either player were to unilaterally change
their action, then their outcome gets worse. This is a very simple
example, and we have made the actions mutually exclusive for
illustration purposes (this is called a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium). In some games, especially those that model pertinent real-
world situations, a player can choose a mixed strategy where
some fraction f of their choices are allocated to action 1 and
the remaining fraction 1 – f of their choices are allocated to action
2. This is called a mixed strategy because a player’s actions are
a mixture of the available actions. The game shown in Figure 1
also possesses a mixed-strategy equilibrium; however, itNeuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 545
Figure 1. Nash Equilibrium
In a strategic interaction between two agents, the
Nash equilibria are any of the set of choices made
by the two agents where any unilateral change in
strategy by one or the other agent does not
improve the agent’s outcome. Illustrated are
payoff tables for a two-agent game where two
agents (players) move simultaneously given two
options (actions). (Top) The payoff table for any
given set of choices made by the two agents.
The green circles highlight the Nash equilibria.
When the two players choose the same action
(upper left or lower left quadrants) they are in
a Nash equilibrium; in this state, any unilateral
change in choice results in a worse outcome,
and the choices are no longer in Nash Equilibrium.
(Bottom) Payoff tables show the best choices
for player 1 (left) given player 20s choices and for
player 2 given player 1’s choices. The set of
players’ choices in this example will tend to main-
tain Nash equilibrium (one of the two green
circles), once it is discovered, since these provide
the best possible outcomes for the pair.
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pure strategy one player always makes more than the other, and
in the real world this might discourage participation altogether.
The Nash concept shows what a player’s best response should
be provided that one’s partner is playing their equilibrium
strategy. In practice, partners do not always play their equilib-
rium strategy—humans often deviate from Nash in practice
even when they know this to be suboptimal (van den Bos
et al., 2008)—in these instances, playing according to a Nash
equilibrium does not equate to the best response. These equilib-
rium concepts, and others, provide rational ways to identify the
best response in a game, a central concept in economics
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Mixed-strategy games can be much better representations of
real-world choice situations. For example, consider a weasel
that visits a clearing possessing two holes. The weasel can
poke its head into hole 1 and get water from an underground
spring that flows sometimes to yield water or is otherwise dry.
Or the weasel can poke its head into hole 2 where another animal
has stashed nuts or not. How should theweasel allocate the frac-
tion of its choices to each of these alternatives once it arrives in
the clearing? In this case, each choice has variable yields, and
the weasel’s nervous system must decide the relative value of
likely returns from each choice before nudging the weasel into
a specific choice. Since the returns from these choices are
stochastic, the weasel must bring a good model of the returns
from each hole, and it must continually re-estimate those returns
conditioned on its past experiences with each hole. This
example shows that the weasel must compute a mixed strategy
for the two choices, but it also illustrates the limit of equilibrium
solutions to this game—the weasel must use some of its546 Neuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.processing power to re-estimate the value
of each choice and so simply focusing on
equilibrium solutions would miss some of
the central features of this real-world
problem. Here, the weasel is constructingand updating predictive models of its (possibly dynamic) food
sources, which represents a departure from simple equilib-
rium-based ‘‘best response’’ models.
This same reasoningwould hold for humans interacting in real-
world exchanges and suggests a kind of blending of strict equi-
librium-based accounts of best responses and predictive
models of others’ behavior. Here, rational agents in the real world
should estimate what fraction of the other agents will choose
their equilibrium strategy and possess or guess something about
what the nonequilibrium agents will do. These kinds of blended
accounts (blends between economic models and predictive
behavioral models) have given rise to cognitive hierarchy models
of how human agents should model those with whom they
interact (Camerer et al., 2004; also see Ray et al., 2008, for use
of cognitive hierarchy model during social exchange).
Some of the most precise connections among valuation,
choice, and neural function have been produced using game-
theoretic settings in nonhuman primates paired with single-unit
electrophysiological recordings (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004;
Sugrue et al., 2004; Seo and Lee, 2007, 2009; also see Platt
and Glimcher, 1999; Hayden et al., 2009; Hayden and Platt,
2010). Figure 2 shows three examples where the visual system
was used primarily as an input-output device and the parameters
of interest involved the valuation of ‘‘where to look.’’ The exper-
iment illustrated at the left represents work by Dorris and
Glimcher using what is called the work-shirk inspection game.
The animal gets one payoff if he is working when the ‘‘employer’’
looks in, another payoff if he is shirking his duties when the
‘‘employer’’ looks in, and so on. The best response for this
game is a mixed strategy, that is, the animal should choose
to distribute its actions across its two behavioral options
Figure 2. Neuroeconomic Approaches to
Studying Choice Behavior in Nonhuman
Primates Paired with Single-Unit
Electrophysiological Recordings
(Top) Nonhuman primates are trained to perform
choice tasks using eye movements: (left) monkeys
fixate until cued to choose ‘‘action 1’’ or ‘‘action 2,’’
which in this example is look to the red circle or
look to the green circle, respectively. The circle
placements are chosen based on the receptive
field of the single unit under study, thus allowing
study of the relationship between single-unit
activity and the choice to take ‘‘action 1’’ or ‘‘action
2.’’ In these studies, the reward is typical a squirt of
juice or water, which is desirable for water-
deprived (thirsty) players. (Bottom) Three game-
theoretic settings used in nonhuman primates to
investigate the connection between value, choice,
and neural activity: (left) payoff table for a two-
player Inspection game, (middle)Dynamic foraging
task, and (right) Matching pennies game played
between a monkey and a computer algorithm.
These games and other uses of game-theoretic
approaches are beginning to expose and model
expected changes in subjects’ behavior.
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setting of a parameter. This game took place while the experi-
menters recorded from neurons in the posterior parietal cortex.
The clever maneuver in this experiment is that the experimenters
parameterized the Nash equilibrium in this game (controlled by
parameter i in Figure 2, left panel). The main conclusion in that
study was that subjective desirability of a behavioral option
covaried with firing-rate changes in the recorded neurons inde-
pendent of the objective parameters related to reward acquisi-
tion. This explanation of the observed data has been questioned
(Sugrue et al., 2005) by an alternative experiment that manipu-
lated local changes in a reward-harvesting task (Sugrue et al.,
2004, see below) while monitoring neural activity in the same
region. We highlight these examples (Dorris and Glimcher,
2004; Sugrue et al., 2004) to demonstrate that the nature of the
quantitative economic choice model in constructing an experi-
ment is very important. Similar approaches will continue to
improve our model-based understanding of the decision vari-
ables encoded in recordable neural activity.
A similar kind of game-theory strategy was used by Lee and
colleagues where a ‘‘matching pennies’’ game (a coordination
game like the example in Figure 2, right panel) was used in
monkeys while single-unit recordings were carried out in the
brain (Barraclough et al., 2004; Seo and Lee, 2007). Again, corre-
lations between neural activity and variables that in theory could
(or should) influence outcomes were observed. Sugrue et al.
(2004) demonstrated another experiment that has used
a game-like probe while recording neural activity. This group
used a visual reward-harvesting task and also recorded from
neurons in the parietal cortex while the rate of reward from
different behavioral options was controlled (a dynamic foraging
task akin to the example in Figure 2, middle panel). These inves-
tigators found that their recordings were most consistent withthe relative value of competing options (here local probability
of eye movements to one of two targets) rather than subjective
desirability (the average payoff of each target). These examples
represent a small fraction of an ever-growing literature using
game-theory-designed tasks to probe animals while recording
some kind of neural variable.
This work is in its early days; however, one common theme
emerges from these experiments, that is, the ability to use
game-theoretic probes to expose and model expected changes
in subjects’ behavior. While the connection of economic vari-
ables to single-neuron activity in these studies remains either
provisional or in some cases disputed, there is no dispute that
the experimental probes provide an excellent way to probe
value-dependent choice in primates at the behavioral level.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that all three studies
highlighted in Figure 2 produced excellent and quite sensitive
behavioral models of the animal’s observed choice behavior
(Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; Seo and Lee,
2007). The conflicting results (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue
et al., 2004) may simply be a limitation of the current experi-
mental capacity to record from a sufficient number and range
of neurons during tasks. Alternatively, it may reflect a deeper
issue of the myriad ways that different brains implement solu-
tions to economic problems at the level of neural networks.
Nevertheless, the behavioral lesson in the animal work has
been taken to heart in the human neurobiology community where
detailed game-theoretic probes have been used to probe every-
thing from response to monetary reward, risk, and even
response to the risks involved in exchanging with other humans.
Interpersonal Economic Exchange and Its Applications
Social exchange occurs in species ranging from insects to
humans (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b; Trivers, 1971). In primates,Neuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 547
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necessitating the capacity to assign social credit or blame for
shared outcomes and to act appropriately according to these
assignments (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Axelrod and
Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). In humans, reci-
procity is one of a collection of mechanisms necessary to
support social exchange (e.g., Trivers, 1971); yet, the underlying
neural representations of these mechanisms remain murky.
In almost all social exchanges, one must detect and accurately
track which social agent (who) gets credit for an outcome.
Should credit for an outcome be assigned to one’s own actions
or those of one’s partner? Understanding such agent-specific
computations is important, because the assignment of social
agency breaks down in a range of mental illnesses, including
schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders (assignment of
social agency: Frith and Frith, 2001; Vogeley et al., 2001; Kelley
et al., 2002; Lieberman and Pfeifer, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2004;
Seger et al., 2004; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Decety and Sommer-
ville, 2003; Lieberman, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2006; Northoff et al.,
2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Saxe et al., 2004; Uddin et al., 2007;
breakdown: Baron-Cohen and Belmonte, 2005; Frith and Frith,
1999; Bru¨ne, 2005; Wischniewski et al., 2009). Social agency
computations are also a prerequisite for generating models of
others’ mental states. This latter capacity, called theory of
mind, is highly developed in humans and has been shown to acti-
vate a consistent set of brain regions in neuroimaging experi-
ments (Gallagher et al., 2000; Brunet et al., 2000; Wicker et al.,
2003; Decety et al., 2004). But establishing agency, while an
important underlying computation for social exchange, is not
sufficient to interact fruitfully with others.
Social exchange, even in its simplest settings, requires
a collection of important computational capacities in the minds
of the interacting agents. In a simple fair trade with another
human, the brain of each trader must be able to (1) compute
norms for what is considered fair, (2) detect deviations from
such norms, and (3) possess the capacity to select appropriate
actions based on these deviations. An adaptive social creature
must understand the meaning of social gestures and the
‘‘normative’’ responses expected from those gestures—all
the while trying to model the specific agent with whom they are
currently interacting. This is a ferociously difficult problem, and
some of themost important pathologies of our mental life revolve
around perturbed function in the domain of social interaction,
including schizophrenia, depression, social anxiety, autism,
and personality disorders. Therefore, it is fundamentally impor-
tant to try and develop objective, quantitative measures of the
neural and behavioral underpinnings of social exchange.
Recent work has begun to identify computational models of
social agent detection, social signaling, and social learning that
connect to measurable neural responses in humans (for review,
see Behrens et al., 2009). This nascent area represents an
opportunity for building computational descriptions of social
exchange that can connect to underlying neurobiology, in
ways that inform both the behavioral and neural computations
underlying pathologies of social interaction seen in a variety of
psychiatric illnesses. Mathematically portrayed economic
exchange games have dominated this new and quantitative
approach to social exchange (Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas548 Neuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2002, 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003; Singer
et al., 2006) because they assess a subject’s internal norm for
what is fair in an exchange, and they require that each subject
model their partner’s mental state (Camerer, 2003; Camerer
and Fehr, 2006; Kagel and Roth, 1997; Montague and Lohrenz,
2007). In summary, these games expose the three component
computations required above for normal social exchange
between two agents. The games have a variety of names—the
well-known prisoner’s dilemma, the dictator game, the
ultimatum game, the trust game, and so on (Axelrod, 1984;
Guth et al., 1982; Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003). They are excellent
experimental probes because they are simple and mathemati-
cally well-specified, there is an existing body of behavioral
data employing them across a variety of contexts, and there
are known solution concepts for how they ‘‘should’’ be played
by a rational self-interested agent (Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003;
Camerer and Fehr, 2006). More importantly, they all require
participants to model their partner. Such simplified behavioral
probes provide an excellent starting point for extracting quanti-
tative descriptions of social signaling and its pathologies
because the parameter space is manageable, and reasonable
normative solutions to these games exist (Camerer, 2003; but
see Greenwald and Jafari, 2003, for complications in solution
concepts). These games have already proven valuable in early
work in clinical populations. The power of these games resides
in their payoff structures and the fact that they could be used to
decompose social interactions into a collection of behavioral
andneural primitives.Suchprimitives could provide a new lexicon
useful for assessingmedical orbehavior therapies, understanding
differing neural strategies for decision-making, and so on.
Single-Shot Fairness Games
The ultimatum game involves two players—the proposer and the
responder (Guth et al., 1982)—and could reasonably be
renamed ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it.’’ In this game, the proposer is
endowed with some resource (say $100) and can offer any split
to the responder. Let’s suppose the proposer offers $80 for
herself and $20 for the responder. If the responder accepts the
split, then both players walk away with money (‘‘take it’’ option).
If the responder rejects, neither player gets anything (‘‘leave it’’
option). Rationally, the proposer should send $1, and the
responder should accept all non-zero offers since they start
with nothing, but experiments show this expectation to be false.
In practice, the proposer sends $40 as their modal offer and
responders reject 50% of the time at an $80:$20 split. These
behavioral results are remarkably consistent and do not appre-
ciably change across diverse cultural settings and experimental
arrangements (Heinrich, 2004). This simple one-shot game
provides an excellent tool to probe the detection of and response
to fairness deviations in an all-or-none fashion; however, one-
shot games miss one central feature of all social exchange—
learning. The single-shot games do not provide an opportunity
to see the effects of the social signal sent to one’s partner.
Humans routinely send social signals to one another (encoded
in a variety of currencies) with the expectation of adjusting their
partner’s behavior in future interactions. Importantly, coopera-
tion in repeated interactions (relationships) can wax and wane,
and social signaling and learning enables individuals to fix
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single-shot interactions can be overcome in part by using amulti-
round fairness game.Interpersonal Fairness Games and the Computations
They Expose
Fairness games collectively expose three important classes of
computations that must be operable during successful two-
party social exchanges:
1) Humans Compute or Retrieve Stable Shared Norms
for What Is Expected in Reciprocal Trades between
Two Individuals
The large initial offers in the ultimatum game, the stable rejection
rate (50%) at an 80:20 split, and the lack of dependence on
cultural factors (Heinrich, 2004) strongly support the existence
of fairness norms for offers during a two-party exchange. Such
norms provide baseline (prior) distributions of acceptable signals
to be sent to others andwhether signals received from others are
acceptable. It has been suggested recently that such normsmay
also be part of a computational depiction of emotion processing
(Montague and Lohrenz, 2007), but this area to date remains
undeveloped. In any case, the presence of norms and their use
in decision-making is parametrically revealed by fairness games.
2) Humans Possess Sensitive Norm-Violation Detection
Mechanisms and These Violations Represent Natural
Classes of Learning Signals
To respond to norm violations, humans must generate and
respond to error signals carrying information about the norm
violation. These kinds of signals have been hinted at in the
reward-processing literature, especially as it makes contact
with dopaminergic systems. A large subset of midbrain dopa-
mine neurons participate in circuits that learn to value and to
predict future rewarding events, especially the delivery of
primary rewards like food, water, and sex (Montague et al.,
1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz and Dickinson,
2000; Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Montague and Berns, 2002;
Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Montague et al., 2004, 2006). More
specifically, midbrain dopamine neurons are thought to emit
reward-prediction errors encoded in modulations in their spike
output (Montague et al., 1996; for review see Schultz, 1998;
Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). This interpretation is strongly sup-
ported for the timing of burst and pause responses in the spike
trains of these neurons (Schultz, 1998; Bayer and Glimcher,
2005). In this work, the goal is to learn from the statistical struc-
ture of reward delivery actually experienced to determine when
expectations have been violated (see Montague et al., 2004,
for review). However, for a ‘‘fair’’ exchange with another human,
a control signal for norm violation would need to be able to report
to a creature that a social partner’s behavior differed from typical
behavior of social partners, both in the mean (like the reward
prediction error) and the variance (like an error in uncertainty
signal), and possibly even include errors in higher-order
moments (see Montague and Lohrenz, 2007).
3) Humans Are Willing, at a Cost to Themselves, to Send
a Corrective Signal (Learning Signal) to Their Partner
To understand the kind of social signal to send to a partner with
thegoal of engineering their behavior, a subjectmust have a suffi-cient model of the partner’s likely response to the signal. In addi-
tion, the willingness to send such a signal at a cost shows that
humans know the likely ‘‘return’’ on the signal. The fairness
games as outlined above and described in detail below expose
this class of computation. So this third capacity requires
a good estimate of the partner’s response and the likely re-
turn—although economically framed in this description, these
are deep social signaling and estimation capacities. Also, in an
experiment by Sanfey et al. (2003), a human’s propensity to
reject unfair splits and the attendant brain responses to such
unfair offers depend on whether they are playing a human or
a computer. Consequently, computation three depends on the
nature of the partner, which is reasonable since corrective
signals sent in such exchanges only work in a particular kind of
agent—a human.
In summary, the use of fairness games provides a window
onto these three classes of computation that take place in simple
two-party exchanges. And while such probes are necessarily
simplified, they are quantitative and general enough to provide
insights into some of the most important component parts of
social exchange.Biomarkers Exposed by Fairness Games
Fairness games are increasingly being used to investigate path-
ological social behavior associated with a variety of psychiatric
illnesses, including borderline personality disorder (King-Casas
et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009; Unoka et al., 2009), psychopathy
(Mokros et al., 2008; Rilling et al., 2007), social anxiety (Sripada
et al., 2009), depression (Hokanson et al., 1980), addiction
(Yi et al., 2007), and autism (Chiu et al., 2008a; Andari et al.,
2010; Yoshida et al., 2010). While each of these illnesses confers
significant social impairment, neurobiological research has tradi-
tionally overlooked social symptoms of psychiatric illness, in part
due to an assumption that behavioral and neural computations
underlying social behaviors are too complex to be amenable to
rigorous study. However, the recent work using fairness games
suggests the promise for these probes of social behavior to be
fruitful in providing sensitive and specific biomarkers for social
pathologies.
One example of this approach has used an iterated ‘‘trust
game’’ to investigate social symptoms of borderline personality
disorder (Figure 3; King-Casas et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009;
Unoka et al., 2009). Similar to the ultimatum game discussed
above, the trust game relies on a shared sense of fairness in
order for an exchange to be mutually beneficial (Berg et al.,
1995; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988). In this game, one person,
dubbed the ‘‘investor,’’ is endowed with a valued resource, typi-
cally money (Figure 3A). An investor can then send any portion of
that endowment (or nothing at all) to a social partner. Whatever
portion of the endowment the investor chooses to send is auto-
matically tripled before being received by the ‘‘trustee,’’ who
then has the opportunity to repay some portion of the tripled
investment. Critically, both the size of investment and size of
repayment are entirely at the discretion the sender; that is,
neither investor nor trustee is required to send anything. Thus,
trust can be quantified as the amount of money one person
sends to another without external enforcement. If both playersNeuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 549
Figure 3. Biomarker for Borderline
Personality Disorder Exposed by
Multiround Trust Game
(A) Iterated trust game: investors are endowed
with $20 at the start of each of ten rounds. Inves-
tors can invest any portion of the endowment
with their partner. The invested amount is tripled
before being passed to the trustee, who can repay
any portion of the tripled investment.
(B) The social norm for investor behavior in the
trust game can be represented as distributions of
likely investments given prior expectations and
accrued experience. Investments are typically
large in this game of cooperation. Thus, small
investments represent a deviation from the social
norm of the task.
(C) A region-of-interest analysis of anterior insula
of 38 healthy trustees shows hemodynamic
activity to be negatively related to size of invest-
ment, consistent with the idea that small invest-
ments represent a deviation in norm. In contrast,
similar analyses among 55 individuals with BPD
showed no significant activation in these regions
when investments were small, suggesting that
low investments do not represent a violation of
an established norm.
(D) Healthy trustees are twice as likely as BPD
trustees to coax when cooperation between players is low. Specifically, healthy trustees are more likely to make a large repayment (R investment amount) after
having received a small investment. Conversely, BPD trustees are more likely to make a small repayment (< investment amount) after receiving a small
investment.
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example that they ought to share the winnings of a game equally
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), then an optimal shared strategy would
be for the investor to send the entire endowment (e.g., invest $20
of $20) and for the trustee to send back half of the tripled invest-
ment (repay $30 of $60). In the context of this structured
exchange, a shared norm and cooperative strategy mutually
benefit both players.
In King-Casas et al. (2008), we used a multiround version of
this simple trust exchange to examine the trajectory of coopera-
tion between healthy investors and trustees with borderline
personality disorder. Individuals with borderline personality
disorder typically have difficulty navigating social relationships,
exhibiting a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal rela-
tionships, frantic efforts to avoid abandonment, inappropriate,
intense anger or difficulty controlling anger, and affective insta-
bility (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Thus, we sought
biomarkers of aberrant social norms and aberrant responses to
norm violations in the context of the repeated trust game, in
order to distinguish healthy cooperative exchange in control
subjects from abnormal social interaction among individuals
with borderline personality disorder.
Although initial levels of cooperation were found to be compa-
rable between healthy dyads (n = 38; healthy investors and
healthy trustee) and BPD dyads (n = 55; healthy investors playing
BPD trustee), cooperation in BPD dyads broke down across the
repeated exchange. Importantly, the breakdown in cooperation
was not attributable to diagnostic differences in the use of reci-
procity as a behavioral strategy (see King-Casas et al., 2005),
indicating that individual BPDs are sensitive to and respond
appropriately to the behavioral signals emitted by their partners.
Rather, diagnostic differences were found when cooperation
between players began to falter. In particular, when investors550 Neuron 67, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.sent small investments to healthy trustees, healthy trustees re-
sponded neurally with greater hemodynamic activity in anterior
insula and responded behaviorally by sending unusually large
repayments (Figure 3C). This ‘‘coaxing’’ strategy was effective
in signaling their own trustworthiness and typically led to greater
investments on subsequent rounds. In contrast, individuals with
BPD showed no increased activity in anterior insula andwere half
as likely to ‘‘coax’’ back higher investments through generous
repayments (Figure 3D).
These results can be interpreted through recent work in affec-
tive, interoceptive, economic, and social domains that implicate
anterior insular cortex in the representation and updating of
norms (Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). For example, in the ulti-
matum game discussed above, anterior insula activity both
scales negatively with offer size (greater activity to unfair offers)
and predicts whether the offer is subsequently rejected (Sanfey
et al., 2003). Similarly, anterior insula activity of observers is
greater when a punishment is applied to players perceived as
fair relative to players perceived as unfair (Singer et al., 2006).
While in nonsocial decision-making tasks, activity in the anterior
insula both encodes and updates representations of risk about
decision outcomes (Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008).
Taken together, insula responses related to low investment
levels in healthy control trustees likely reflect these subjects’
sensitivity to deviations in normative behavior of a trust game.
That is, healthy control trustees expect greater investment levels
from social partners, and seek to ‘‘coax’’ back high investments
when cooperation begins to break down. In contrast, trustees
with borderline personality disorder show decreased sensitivity
to the social norm of the game (high investments) and were
therefore less likely to coax back the normative behavior from
their partner. This result suggests that borderline personality
disorder confers a diminished capacity to represent
Neuron
Perspectiveexpectations for social partners, and as a consequence individ-
uals with BPD cannot take corrective action (social control
signal) that might serve to reestablish cooperative interaction.
While the diagnostic and predictive utility of such approaches
to understanding social pathologies remains to be proved, the
sensitivity of behavior in fairness games to modulation by
common pharmacological interventions suggests that identified
aberrant social computations may be effectively treated with
already available (and developing) therapeutics (e.g., seroto-
nergic modulation: Crockett et al., 2008; Tse and Bond, 2002a,
2002b; Wood et al., 2006; oxytocin modulation: Kosfeld et al.,
2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008; Declerck et al., 2010; Andari
et al., 2010).
Is There a Genetic Basis for the Computations Carried
Out in Fairness Games?
The biomarkers exposed by interpersonal exchange games
could provide quantitative phenotypes that geneticists could
use to identify genes responsible for building neural circuitry
with the capacity to make neurotypical computations and there-
fore express neurotypical decision behavior. Furthermore, genes
underlying subtle to extreme disruptions in the capacity to
perform these computations could be identified and would serve
as the ultimate biomarkers of mental disorders. The most
common mental disorders have been demonstrated to be highly
heritable, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major
depression, and autism spectrum disorder; however, only
recently has evidence emerged that suggests traits expressed
in fairness games and neuroimaging experiments are heritable
as well. Recent work has demonstrated high heritability of fair-
ness game behavior (Cesarini et al., 2008; Wallace et al., 2007)
and fMRI responses (Matthews et al., 2007) in humans. Specifi-
cally, cooperative behavior (investment and reciprocity
measures) in the single-shot trust game was demonstrated to
be highly influenced by genetic factors (Cesarini et al., 2008) as
were rejection rates in the ultimatum game (Wallace et al.,
2007). Additionally, polymorphisms in the oxytocin receptor
gene (OXTR) have been associated with specific behavioral
responses in a dictator game (Israel et al., 2009).
The heritability reported in this work matches or is better than
estimated heritability using DSM IV criteria; however, economic
games are quantitative and parametric while the DSMuses cate-
gorical criteria often related directly to the symptom lists that
define the disorders. Consequently, the economic games may
provide a new way to better understand the successes of DSM
IV criteria, identify its failures, and provide new ways to look for
genetic underpinnings. Finally, brain responses measured with
fMRI during a conflict response task were recently shown to be
heritable as well in a study involving female twin pairs (Matthews
et al., 2007). Together, these studies suggest that fairness
games and the computations they expose can generate quanti-
tative phenotypes that will allow for further investigation into the
underlying genetic influences of decision-making in neurotypical
individuals and individuals with mental disorders.
Summary
Social exchange is a gamble all humans take; however, humans
mitigate the risks associated with such exchanges by relying ondeep models of other humans’ likely intentions and responses.
While lifelong experience with others humans clearly influences
these models of others, it is also likely that many important
components of such models are inherited from our ancestors
in order to provide good priors for estimating the risks and
rewards for engaging in a wide range of interpersonal
exchanges. When the biological substrates implementing these
models are damaged or altered in a significant way, abnormal
behavior is certain to be expressed. Economic games are begin-
ning to provide new ways to capture and quantify this behavior
and its associated neural correlates and may well produce new
biomarkers of mental disease. Furthermore, these probes
seem ideally suited to identify some of the genetic underpinnings
of important quantitative features of mental function because
they generate parametric variation along a variety of cognitive
dimensions. This last point is quite important since many
aspects of mental illness express as quantitative differences
along normal cognitive dimensions. This work is still in its
infancy, and so the real payoffs lie mainly in the future. However,
the integration of economically framed probes with modern
measures of neural function appears to be a growth area
especially in the possible applications to mental disease and
brain injury.
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